The New Chinese Immigration to Japan by Bail, Hélène Le
 China Perspectives 
61 | september-october 2005
Varia
The New Chinese Immigration to Japan







Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Édition imprimée




Hélène Le Bail, « The New Chinese Immigration to Japan », China Perspectives [En ligne], 61 |
 september-october 2005, mis en ligne le 01 septembre 2008, consulté le 28 octobre 2019. URL :
http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/521  ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.521 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 28 octobre 2019.
© All rights reserved
The New Chinese Immigration to
Japan
Between mobility and integration
Hélène Le Bail
1 In 2003, according to Japanese government figures, 462,396 Chinese people were living
in Japan, making up a quarter of its foreign residents. Although Koreans make up the
country’s largest foreign community, the Chinese are by far the most numerous new
arrivals since the end of the 1970s. This article deals with these Chinese newcomers,
who  differ  from  the  traditional  image  of  immigrants  in  two  ways:  they  are
exceptionally well  qualified,  enjoying high socioeconomic status—12% belong to the
most favoured social classes while nearly all  could be counted as middle class;  and,
having created flourishing and active ethnic business activity, the Chinese newcomers
are not observed to have segregated themselves economically or residentially as they
have in Europe.
2 This situation is partially explained by Japan’s policy on immigration. This has been
modified since the end of the 1980s but remains very restrictive, allowing only a small
number  of  qualified  workers  to  come  in.  There  is  a  significant  gap  between  this
immigration policy and the presence in Japan of a large number of unskilled or semi-
skilled  workers1.  The  gap  is  explained  by  the  recourse  to  roundabout  methods  of
importing low-skilled foreign labour, such as running trainee programmes, opening the
borders  to  people  of  Japanese  descent  in  Latin  America  (the  Nikkeijin)  or  issuing
student visas. Faced with industry’s labour requirements, “the government consciously
resorts to side door or back door [immigration] policies”2. In this context, the plan to
bring the number of foreign students up to 100,000 by the year 2000 (a project first
announced in 1983), provided a privileged immigration route for the Chinese. Chinese
students accept unskilled employment: for many, the jobs are temporary, lasting just
long  enough  to  fund  their  studies.  Once  they  have  graduated  from  Japanese
universities, those deciding to stay on generally attain skilled posts, even highly skilled
posts. The temporary nature of unskilled jobs helps perhaps to explain the low level of
segregated activity.  And access to skilled employment explains the wide residential
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dispersal. Above all, the fact that a large number of Chinese immigrants should have
come in via the selective route of study accounts for their social mobility.
3 In its first part, this article describes the processes by which, as they settled in Japan,
the  migrants  set  up  networks  of  student  immigrants;  it  will  look  at  how  the  new
migrant inflows explain the present characteristics of the Chinese population in Japan;
and it will seek to explain how its high level of skills and lack of ethnic separatism have
favoured social mobility in Japan.
4 In  the  second  part,  the  article  looks  more  specifically  at  the  roles  played  by
transnational entrepreneurs and expatriates, and examines how their sense of place,
their connections with their society of origin—China—and of residence—Japan—throw
new light  on  research  in  terms  of  returning  home  or  of  integration  into  the  host
country.
Chinese immigration to Japan: the preponderance of student networksThe old and the
new immigrants to Japan: two quite distinct communities
5 The  Japanese  language  uses  the  English  terms  “oldcomers”  and  “newcomers”  to
designate,  respectively,  immigrants  who  arrived  before  1945  and  those  who  have
arrived since the second half of the 1970s. The oldcomers are, in the main, Koreans, but
also include a small  number of  Chinese people,  mostly from Taiwan.  This  article  is
concerned only with the newcomers, originating mostly from mainland China. These
two inflows of Chinese immigrants have few features in common.
6 Unlike other countries in the organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Japan carried out its reconstruction and launched its post-war economic take-
off  without  recourse  to  immigration.  It  was  not  until  the  mid-1970s  that  the
government  began  opening  its  frontiers  to  foreign  workers.  China,  for  its  part,
liberalised  its  emigration  policy  only  from 1978  onwards.  So  the  inflow of  Chinese
migrants to Japan was halted for more than thirty years.
7 The very slow rise in Japan’s Chinese population between the 1950s and 1980 contrasts
with the constantly increasing inflow over the past twenty-five years (see Table 1).
Chinese residents numbered 52,896 in 1980;  the figure rose to 150,339 in 1990,  and
reached  462,396  by  20033.  When  one  takes  into  account  those  people  in  irregular
situations, estimated by the Ministry of Justice at some 30,000 in 2004, together with
those  who have  taken Japanese  nationality,  the  total  number  of  Chinese  people  or
people of Chinese origin is up around 600,0004. Before the 1980s, the number of long-
term immigrants  was about  50,000 people;  it  cannot  have increased by very much,
given the low birthrate of the Japanese. So we may estimate the number of Chinese
people (or people of Chinese origin), who have arrived in Japan since the end of the
1970s and living in Japan, at 550,000 people. 
 
The New Chinese Immigration to Japan
China Perspectives, 61 | september-october 2005
2
1. Population of Chinese Nationality Officially Registered in Japan
8 The gulf between the communities, the oldcomers and the newcomers, has as much to
do with the successes of some as with the difficulties encountered by others. In the
course  of  interviews  conducted  in  Tokyo  in  2004-2005,  the  newcomers  who  have
succeeded  in  society  often  expressed  their  respect  for  the  earlier  generations  of
immigrants (whom they currently refer to as old huaqiao, while emphasising the socio-
cultural gulf that divides them.
9 The President  of  the Association of  Chinese Scientists  and Engineers  in Japan says:
“Relations between one group of Chinese people living in Japan and another are often
virtually non-existent. As between the newcomers and the old huaqiao, this is due to
differences in education.  Ourselves,  we’re mostly employed in the high-tech sector,
while the old huaqiao are very often in trade or catering: these are different worlds”5.
10 Beginning in the early 1990s, when the inflow of Chinese students swelled rapidly, the
newcomers’ image deteriorated in the wake of scandals about phoney students, illegal
immigrants and criminal behaviour, these various elements becoming lumped together
in the media and the public mind. The older generation of immigrants then sought to
distance themselves from these newcomers in order to preserve their own image as a
model community. Attitudes on both sides hardened, and it is only recently that the
communities have come together for common projects. In December 2004 for instance,
they  set  up  a  joint  committee  to  consider  how  best  to  teach  Chinese  culture  and
language to children of the second and third generations. The older generation, seeing
their community losing its dynamism, became aware that they had every interest in co-
operating with the newcomers.
11 The two communities had kept apart from each other all the more easily since they
rarely had any family connections, and since the old Chinese community offered few
work opportunities to the newcomers. Indeed, the latter hardly ever sought to revive
former ties. From the 1980s onward, new migrant networks had been established.
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Networks of migrant students and insertion into the middle and upper classes
12 The community of the newcomers is mainly composed of Chinese students who have
arrived since the 1980s.  The choice of  coming to Japan with a student visa may be
analysed in terms of migratory strategy. Those who arrived in the 1980s often had a
stable situation in China and reasonably skilled employment. The principal motivation
for choosing to leave as a student was the desire to see beyond the frontiers, to seize
new opportunities for training and professional experience. The first students to arrive
were quick to  send for  their  spouses,  their  brothers,  sisters  or  close  friends,  while
helping them to obtain student visas.  Thus,  student migrant networks were formed
based on various big Chinese cities, notably Shanghai and Peking, then on the cities of
the northeast (Dongbei) such as Shenyang or Dalian, and on the province of Fujian.
13 According to the annual report of the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, in
1999, Japan’s Chinese population was distributed as follows: 41,041 people had come
originally from Shanghai (15.1%), 38,524 from Taiwan (14.2%), 33,750 from Heilongjiang
(12.4%),  25,750 from Liaoning (9.5%),  23,554 from Fujian (8.7%),  18,548 from Peking
(6.8%), and 17,522 from Jilin (6.4%). The most recent available figures, for 2003, show an
increase in the population originating from the three Dongbei provinces (Heilongjiang,
Liaoning and Jilin), representing 36% of all Chinese residents in Japan. Shanghai has
fallen to second position and Taiwan to fifth. These figures also illustrate the steadily
falling proportion of  Chinese immigrants  coming in from the traditional  regions of
origin: Fujian is only sixth and the Canton region is far behind. The new migratory flow
into Japan is dominated by people coming from the big cities and the northern regions.
14 These 2003 figures also tell us much about the changes in migratory inflows. The role
played by the student networks tends to diminish in the big cities where migratory
trajectories  are  increasingly individual;  but  it  continues to  be important  in smaller
towns or in more remote regions. That is particularly the case with the three Dongbei
provinces, and also with Inner Mongolia.
15 The Mongolian minority within the Chinese community in Tokyo offers an interesting
example6. This community numbers some four thousand people across Japan, most of
whom live in Tokyo. The first students belonging to the Mongolian minority arrived in
the second half of the 1990s with the help of contacts, often with university teachers
specialising in Mongolian culture.  The teachers enabled a number of researchers to
come to China by sending them the letter of invitation they needed in order to obtain
visas as student researchers. This one- or two-year visa allows the students to study for
the university entrance exam. The first to arrive later brought in their relatives and
friends,  helping  them  to  obtain  letters  of  invitation  from  teachers  at  the  same
university,  and  then,  little  by  little,  from  teachers  at  other  universities.  In  Japan,
knowing someone is important if you want a student visa.
16 The student network is  a  powerful  mutual  aid system, useful  for  finding work and
accommodation. A Chinese musician of the Mongolian minority told us: “This is my
sister’s old apartment, which she left me when I first arrived. She’s living quite close
by, and so is my brother. It’s good to live near other Mongolians; we see each other
often; we can discuss things, and eat together. In the building [where I live], there are
eight apartments, all occupied by Mongolians! There are two of us here: I’ve taken in a
nephew who’s doing English studies in a language school (he’s hoping to be able to
move on somewhere else). My eldest son will graduate this year from the School of
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Music at the Inner Mongolian University. He wants to come to Japan as well. I shall
have to think about that.” (46 year old man)7.
17 In some districts of Tokyo, such as Tobu-Nerima and Sugamo, Chinese people belonging
to the Mongolian minority are especially numerous. Mongolian students succeed one
another in the same apartment. When one of them goes back to China or moves on to
better  accommodation  (because  in  many  cases  the  apartments  are  in  dilapidated
buildings),  he passes the lease on to someone else. The students generally work for
Japanese entrepreneurs. They advise each other on finding employment or introduce
new arrivals to their bosses. One young woman of 28 says that she worked for three
years in a hospital canteen; she had replaced her own husband there and worked with
two other Mongolians. Later on, she found a job in an izakaya (a traditional Japanese
bar) where she had been introduced by a Mongolian friend who was cooking there. 
18 As with the students coming from other Chinese regions, the educational level of these
Mongolians  is  high.  Many are  teachers  at  secondary level  or  higher;  and the great
majority are university graduates. Those who stay on after their studies in Japan are
the most highly qualified and some obtain posts as university teachers. The fact that
education  has  been the  immigration  route  favoured by  the  Chinese  has  imposed  a
strong element of educational selection on the newcomers. Once they have graduated
from Japanese universities, those able to stay and work in Japan have often obtained
skilled  employment  in  the  best  Japanese  enterprises.  Many  others  have  taken  on
temporary jobs before starting their own enterprises or businesses. In the space of one
generation,  these  Chinese  people  who  came  in  as  students  and  who  suffered  a
temporary drop in social status just long enough to pay for their studies have quickly
gone on to highly skilled posts and to a stable social situation.
Socioeconomic diversification and stratification of the new Chinese immigrants
19 Of course, all the Chinese students and former students in Japan cannot claim the same
success. The selection criteria for obtaining a student visa have been by-passed by some
immigrant candidates, whose main aim in coming was to earn money quickly. Other
students,  once  they  were  in  Japan,  realised  that  following  courses  in  the  Japanese
language and sitting the  entrance exams for  universities  or  vocational  schools  was
beyond  them.  Many  found  themselves  in  irregular  circumstances.  Others  found
alternative solutions for staying on, such as marrying a Japanese person, or finding a
counterfeit contract in a Chinese enterprise. Quite often, success in Japan depends on
the educational level students have acquired before leaving China. Within the Chinese
population now settled in Japan, one can observe the diversification of socioeconomic
status: some have benefited from rapid social advancement, while others have suffered
a drop in status compared with what they enjoyed in China.
20 The stratification of the Chinese population in Japan arises from the diversity of the
careers  they  have  followed  in  Japan,  and  also  from  the  diverse  range  of  entry
procedures.  Figures  provided  by  the  Immigration  Bureau  enable  us  to  observe  the
variety of migratory trajectories. In 2002, entry by means of a visa for the spouses and
children of Japanese citizens went up to 4,572 and the number of residents with this
status  rose  to  53,126  (see  Table  2).  Those  holding  this  type  of  visa  include  some
descendants  of  the  Japanese  wives  and  children  who  stayed  on  in  China  after  the
Japanese were defeated in 1945. But their numbers are falling as they obtain permanent
residence  visas  or  Japanese  nationality,  and this  type  of  visa  corresponds  today  to
marriages between Chinese women and Japanese men. The cases of Filipino wives of
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Japanese  men  have  come  under  intense  media  scrutiny,  and  it  is  true  that,  as  a
proportion of the Filipino population in Japan, their number is significant. However, in
strictly numerical terms, Chinese wives of Japanese men are more numerous. Figures
for 2003 put the Chinese wives at 10,242, as against 7,794 Filipino wives (see Table 3).
21 We  do  not  have  any  figures  relating  to  the  origins  of  Chinese  women  married  to
Japanese  men,  but  two  tendencies  can  be  detected.  Both  are  explained  by  new
migratory  inflows  from  the  northeast  of  China.  Firstly,  whereas  up  to  now  these
marriages were the result of meetings in Japan between Chinese women students and
Japanese men,  it  seems that  the proportion of  marriages  organised on the Chinese
mainland is  growing significantly.  Secondly,  while  the practice  of  making arranged
marriages has for a long time been more prevalent among Fujian women, today the
women of  Dongbei are in first  place.  Inter-ethnic marriages of  this  kind have been
going on ever since the new Chinese immigration began, but only these past few years
can one speak of a real migratory strategy. Matrimonial agencies, more or less official,
have become as active in the great Japanese cities as on the Chinese mainland; the
evidence can be seen by browsing their numerous websites or by looking through the
small ads in Japan’s Chinese newspapers. Similar agencies are particularly numerous in
Dongbei8. While one cannot speak of a network in this instance, one can imagine that
Chinese women will more readily embark on this venture if they have acquaintances
already living in Japan.  Moreover,  most  of  the matrimonial  agencies  in Japan were
founded by Chinese residents, in co-operation with old acquaintances in the cities they
came from. In very many cases, the Japanese applicants for arranged marriages are
either old men, or farmers, or low-paid workers. Their Chinese wives find themselves
isolated in their homes, or obliged to take low-skilled jobs. Many of these women suffer
a drop in social status by comparison with their situation in China.
 
2. Distribution of Foreign Population in Japan by Residential Status in 2002
22 Another entry mechanism that has developed over recent years is the acquisition of
visas for work in the entertainment industry. The number of residents who came in
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with this type of visa went up from 931 in 1998 to 2,762 in 2002. Despite this official
increase,  the proportion of  Chinese people  living in Japan with this  status  remains
small  (see  Tables  2  and  4).  For  a  long  time,  Filipinos  have  had  the  highest
representation. This type of visa applies mainly to women employed as bar hostesses,
even as prostitutes. Employees in this sector are not all necessarily in possession of
entertainment visas and it is difficult to measure how quickly things are developing;
even so, Chinese female prostitution is certainly more and more visible in Tokyo. Even
more  than  the  proliferation  of  arranged  marriages,  the  increasing  numbers  of
entertainment visas indicates a lowering in the social status of new Chinese arrivals, a
step down for some individuals, at any rate the casualisation of their jobs.
 
3. Mixed Marriages, Numbered by Nationality
23 The diversification of the migratory trajectories of Chinese people in Japan goes hand
in hand with the social and cultural stratification of the newcomers’ community. The
latter is still dominated by students. The acquisition of a student visa is still the main
entry procedure for medium- and long-term residence. The number of Chinese people
living in Japan with secondary school or training college (or language school) visas is
even rising regularly: from 32,370 and 20,050 respectively in 1998 to 73,795 and 35,450
in 2002. Students make up more than a quarter of the Chinese residents, a far higher
proportion than for other foreign communities (fewer than 4% of the Korean residents,
0.16% of the Brazilians and 0.6% of Filipinos). So the student visa is still  a favoured
means of entry among Chinese would-be immigrants.
24 The second most  common type  of  status  among the  Chinese  is  that  of  resident  or
permanent resident. These would be people who have been in Japan for at least three
years.  According  to  surveys  carried  out  in  the  mid-1990s  among  Chinese  people
employed in Japan, Wang Jin estimated that 75% were former students9. According to
figures from the Immigration Bureau on work permits issued to recent graduates from
abroad,  Chinese people are strongly represented (see Table 2).  There were 1,933 in
2002; over the past decade, more than 1,500 each year have obtained work visas at the
end of their studies. Wang Jin reports that 92% of the Chinese people employed in Japan
in 1996 were university graduates: it seems quite clear that a large proportion of the
Chinese  population  in  Japan  is  highly  qualified  despite  the  tendency  towards
diversification of socioeconomic status.
 
4. Number of Foreign Residents Holding an « Entertainment Industry » Visa
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25 Of course, the population of Chinese people newly arrived in Japan includes people in a
variety of different situations. However, within that overall category, a type of resident
does  emerge:  people  whose way of  life,  and whose connection to  their  roots,  their
identity, and their societies of residence and of origin contrast sharply with the image
of  the  immigrant  worker  or  the  diaspora.  These  residents  would  be  more  like  the
Hongkongers as described for example by Aihwa Ong10. 
The transnational entrepreneur and the Chinese expatriate: a new sense of place
26 It is not uncommon these days to hear of Chinese people living abroad now choosing to
return home, because China offers more in the way of professional opportunities and
social mobility, to some, than do their countries of residence. This change in migratory
choices based on strategies of accumulation confirms the fact that one can no longer
study  migration  in  terms  of  outflows  from countries  known as  peripheral  towards
developed countries. Today, migratory flows run across each other and become more
complex.  In  Japan,  the  Chinese-language  press  is  much exercised by  the  subject  of
Chinese  immigrants  moving  back  to  China;  but  the  numbers  of  such  people  are
apparently  still  quite  small.  The  December  2003  issue  of  China  Scholars  Abroad
(Shenzhou xueren)11, a review connected to the Chinese Education Ministry, proposed
to keep a special dossier on returning students, with the title: “From the fever to go
abroad to the fever to come home: the brains are coming back”. In the same issue,
however, an article stressed how small was the returning inflow from Japan: “Amongst
this incoming tide of Chinese people returning home, why so few from Japan?” Chinese
people do express great uncertainty about how long they will stay in Japan12, as though
they were keeping a close eye on the Chinese market. Yet, the vagueness surrounding
their future plans does not impede the process of adapting to their host country. By
examining the figures of the transnational entrepreneur and the expatriate, both very
prominent among the Chinese community in Japan, we hope to describe how the links
to the society of origin and to the host society are changing, and what that implies in
terms of integration and the concept of citizenship.
Transnational entrepreneurs and regional living space
27 The role expressed by the term “transnational entrepreneur” has been much studied
since the 1990s13. Transnationalism relates back to the process whereby migrants, in
their daily activities, forge and maintain social, economic and political relationships
linking  their  societies  of  origin  and  residence  and  enabling  the  formation  of
transnational  social  fields  to  extend  beyond  frontiers.  By  “transnational  Chinese
entrepreneurs”  we  mean those  people  at  the  head of  enterprises  who connect  the
Chinese  and  Japanese  societies  and  form,  through  their  professional  activities,  a
transnational social field—which, in this particular case, is a regional social field given
the close proximity of the two countries. 
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5 Number of Naturalisations
28 Transnational  entrepreneurs  bring  to  bear  the  complementary  capacities  of  their
adopted country and their country of origin, and sometimes of a third country too.
Wang Jin’s article, in the same issue, illustrates the case of Chinese entrepreneurs in
Japan in the information technology (IT) sector—probably their most favoured sector in
that country. The IT company EPS illustrates very well how those Chinese students who
arrived in the 1980s,  graduated from Japanese universities,  succeeded in Japan and
then extended their activities back to China. EPS was founded in 1991 in Tokyo by a
newcomer from China. Today the company has over 1,000 employees; it was floated on
the Stock Exchange in 1998;  and it  has  opened branches in Peking and Shanghai14.
There are admittedly many Chinese transnational entrepreneurs in the IT sector, but
they are also involved in a wide range of other activities. We shall borrow from Tajima
Junko the example of M., who founded the first Chinese television channel in Japan15.
She arrived in 1988, entered a language school and then attended a short university
course in accountancy. Having graduated in 1992, she founded a Chinese newspaper
that was the second of its kind in Japan. Its range of activities has widened to include
travel services, property and administrative services. In 1997, she launched Japan’s first
Chinese-language television channel: today it has more than 20,000 subscribers. In the
same period, she founded in Shanghai a business also aimed at supplying the needs of
migrants  in Japan:  supplying news via  the Internet  or  organising events  to  reunite
families still in China with their relatives in Japan.
29 This kind of extended space for professional activity, reaching out from Japan towards
China, is not limited to those few people who, as in the two preceding examples, have
succeeded particularly well.  There are many Chinese people who have started small
businesses  offering  translation  services,  employment  agencies  for  recruiting  skilled
labour  from  China,  or  matrimonial  agencies.  These  more  modest  transnational
entrepreneurs  are  helped  in  expanding  their  activities  by  the  growing  strength  of
China’s economic resources; and they travel frequently between the two countries.
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30 For  transnational  entrepreneurs  like  these,  the  everyday  living  space  is  no  longer
national but regional. Many newcomers, in their interviews, gave us their impressions
of living in a continuous space between China and Japan, its continuity hardly troubled
by the formalities of crossing borders. So a Chinese researcher tells us that he often
goes to China for his work and that, in fact, Japan is “an extension of China”, a sort of
new Chinese province16. As M. describes it, without actually having “returned home”,
her life is lived on both sides of the sea. She goes every month to Shanghai.  If  she
sometimes does think of settling down there again, living in the one or the other city
does not seem very different to her. Tokyo is less and less a foreign city. All the Chinese
products one could want are available there; you hear Chinese spoken everywhere; and
Shanghai is only a two-and-a-half-hour flight away. In a sense, the “return home” is
already partially complete, or could be effected at any moment without causing much
of an upheaval.
The “expatriate”: a fluid connection with the host society and a partial return home
31 Even though most of  the Chinese people living in Japan make the China-Japan trip
several  times  a  year  to  visit  their  families,  they  are  not  for  all  that  committed  to
activities of a transnational nature. In their jobs or their family lives they do not enjoy
the same mobility as the transnational entrepreneurs; even so, their way of life, their
attitudes to the host society and the way they see themselves do distance them from
the traditional image of the immigrant worker. I would apply to this second group the
term “expatriate”17. It designates someone working or living in a foreign country, but
the word also conveys a number of different connotations. The expatriate suggests the
image of a foreign resident in a relatively privileged situation; one has the feeling that
his or her relationship to the host society is not framed as for immigrants in terms of
integration or exclusion: the expatriate has sufficient human capital to be able to leave
at any moment. Looked at in this way, the expatriate’s image is different from that of
the classic immigrant, who has come from a poorer country planning to make a new
life. In a slightly caricatured way, the Chinese expatriate resembles the Western man or
woman rather than the immigrants from less developed countries. In Japan, there is a
deep divide between Western residents  and Asian immigrants.  Foreigners  from the
West are considered as expatriates; Asians look like temporary workers. However, the
Chinese people in Japan are looking increasingly like expatriates, in their lifestyle, in
the image they have of themselves and in their relationship to the country of residence.
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6. Foreign Population in Kawasaki and Number of Applications to the Kawasaki City Representative
Assembly for Foreigner Residents
32 According to various surveys of foreign residents, the behaviour of the Chinese in such
areas as leisure activities, the company they keep, their civic commitments, is closer to
that of Europeans and Americans than of other Asian nationals18. Quite obviously, this
similarity in behaviour reflects the similarity in socioeconomic status and educational
levels among Chinese people and Westerners in Japan. The only great difference in
behaviour is in their attitudes towards naturalisation: more Chinese people will take
this step than will Europeans or Americans, because of the advantages conferred by a
Japanese passport in terms of mobility.
33 Unlike the transnational entrepreneurs, the professional and everyday living space of
the expatriates  is  Japanese society.  However,  like them, the expatriates  aspire  to  a
partial return to their home country and often achieve it. Indeed, it is not uncommon
for Chinese couples working in Japan or the spouses of Japanese people to plan for a
partial home-coming to China. Those married to Japanese people, in particular, often
make such plans: when the Japanese husband or wife retires, they say, they will switch
regularly between China and Japan, “six months here and six months there”. To that
end, many have already acquired accommodation in China; those coming from the big
cities  buy  a  place  back  home,  while  those  from  small  towns  prefer  some  more
developed region. This kind of partial return home (or “migratory circulation” as it was
defined by a team of French researchers in the late 1990s19) is a quite different project
from the dreams expressed in the Chinese diaspora20,  of returning to a more or less
mythical homeland.
34 When Chinese  people  arrange this  partial  return  for  themselves  to  China,  we  may
suppose that they have also put down roots to some extent in Japan. The permanence
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of their links to their country of origin is not opposed to their integration into the
country of residence.
Should we take a fresh look at integration and citizenship?
35 We may liken the way of life and the sense of place of the Chinese newcomers to that of
the other expatriates living in Japan. During the interviews that we conducted,  the
Chinese  do  compare  themselves  to  Westerners,  but  also  to  Hongkongers  in  their
extreme mobility for professional purposes. Are we witnessing the “Hongkongisation”
of  the  behaviour  of  Chinese  people  from the mainland? This  question brings  us  to
Aihwa Ong’s work and to her concept of “flexible citizenship”21. By this is meant the
strategies adopted by and the effects of mobility upon businessmen, technocrats and
highly qualified professionals seeking to draw a profit from different nation-states by
selecting separate places for their investments, their work and their family lives. Ong
develops her theory by testing it against the case of the Hongkongers, but, to some
extent, we may find the same phenomenon among mainland Chinese people in Japan.
36 The question of naturalisation is perhaps the most meaningful. As we observed earlier,
according to studies carried out in the prefectures of Kanagawa and Tokyo, the Chinese
have a greater propensity to ask for Japanese nationality than Europeans or Americans.
Ministry  of  Justice  figures  show  that,  in  numbers  of  naturalisations  per  year,  the
Chinese come second only to the Koreans (see Table 5). The Koreans seeking Japanese
nationality  are  mainly  oldcomers,  whereas  the  Chinese  applicants  are  mostly
newcomers.
37 The interviews we conducted in Tokyo have led us to conclude that,  in most cases,
naturalisation is clearly seen as a pragmatic step, rather than a search for identity.
While the closed nature of Japanese society and historical differences are what still
impel many Chinese people to ask for naturalisation, there are many others who do it
with the sole purpose of enjoying greater international mobility. In the words of the
teacher  U  (a  57  year-old  Japanese  man  married  to  a  Chinese  woman),  while  for
oldcomers nationality was “a question of skin”, for newcomers “it was just a matter of
what  shirt  you  wear”.  Nationality  and  identity  are  increasingly  becoming  separate
things,  as  W (a  35  year-old  woman)  puts  it:  “We don’t  attach much importance to
nationality, and anyway we’re thinking of changing ours, because Chinese nationality
isn’t  practical.  Perhaps  we’ll  take  Japanese  nationality  or,  preferably,  Canadian  or
American. This certainly doesn’t mean that our cultural identity isn’t important, we
will be Chinese whatever happens. Nationality (guoji) and attachment to one’s country
(aiguo) are two separate things”22.
38 Those for whom Japanese nationality is a problem sometimes plan to go and live for a
while in North America, in order to obtain a different nationality, and then come back
to work in Japan. Nationality and place of work may be dealt with one at a time. The
question of the children’s education is equally indicative of the way in which these
Chinese residents take what they can from various countries.  It  is  common for the
Chinese to send their children to study in Anglo-Saxon countries at university level; but
at the primary or secondary levels they sometimes prefer the Chinese school system to
the Japanese.
39 In a recent essay, Aihwa Ong speaks of the “flow-through population”, to describe the
expatriates in Singapore (among whom the Chinese are ever more numerous), who are
free to come and go while enjoying all the advantages of citizenship23. The expression
“flow-through population” reflects the anxiety of the host country on the subject of
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integration and civic  commitment.  Research during  the  1990s  on the  transnational
practices of migrants often created the image of migrants who no longer needed to be
anchored  in  the  society  where  they  lived24.  This  absence  of  anchorage  has  raised
disputes  and  concerns  over  what  kind  of  civic  commitment  such  transnational
migrants  could  possibly  have,  and  over  the  future  of  national  models  based  on
citizenship.
40 For some years, researchers have been attempting to show that transnational practices
are not necessarily in opposition with being committed to the society of residence.
Alexandro Portes and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, for example, examine how transnational
practices can favour social mobility and thus enable immigrants to strengthen their
position in the host country by finding ways around some barriers to adaptation25. Even
more recently, Christian Joppke and Ewa Morowska demonstrate that the development
of transnational practices does not necessarily negate the importance of the nation-
state or the anchoring of the immigrant within it26. They assert that developments in
various  countries  of  immigration  prove  that  “adaptation  and  use  of  host-society
resources and the maintenance of ‘transnational’ linkages with the society or origin”
go  hand  in  hand.  In  their  view,  assimilation—the  term  these  writers  prefer  to
integration—and  transnationalism  are  two  simultaneous  processes.  In  the  end,  the
important  question  is  how  people  living  in  a  transnational  or  supranational  space
perform as citizens.
41 The case of the Chinese transnational entrepreneurs and expatriates living in Japan
illustrates  the  parallel  processes  taking  place:  the  widening  of  their  living  space—
regional,  transnational and cosmopolitan—and their adaptation to the host country.
Tajima Junko,  who has for years been researching the new Chinese immigration to
Japan and its transnational character, emphasises that, in contrast with the old huaqiao
(she  uses  huaqiao  in  its  legal  sense,  namely,  Chinese  people  having  permanent
residence permits) the new huaqiao often express the feeling of being part of Japanese
society27.
42 We have shown to what extent the professional and identity practices of some Chinese
people  in  Japan tend to  go  beyond national  frontiers  and are  part  of  a  process  of
migratory  circulation:  over  here,  and  over  there,  are  no  longer  in  opposition,  and
integration  is  no  longer  lived  as  a  necessity,  as  a  choice  to  be  made  by  those  not
wishing  to  return  to  their  homelands.  It  is  true  that  the  concept  of  migratory
circulation has enabled us, now that it is necessary, to envisage migratory phenomena
from a  different  point  of  view,  freed from the  dichotomy between integration and
return to the homeland.  Nonetheless,  it  is  also true that,  with time,  the process of
integration  continues  inevitably.  We understand integration  in  both  its  senses:  the
immigrant  adapting  to  his  society  of  residence  and the  host  country  adapting  and
changing to take account of its new members28.
43 It is difficult to measure someone’s level of integration since the process is dynamic and
never-ending. However, there is a range of currently accepted criteria by which the
integration of migrants into the host society can be estimated: these include mixed
marriages,  children succeeding at school and participation in political life.  If  we do
apply these criteria, the Chinese newcomers in Japan show a higher level of integration
into Japanese society than do many other foreigners. When we consider inter-ethnic
marriages, we have seen that Chinese spouses are particularly numerous. Figures for
the offspring of these mixed marriages are equally meaningful:  in 2003 alone, 3,133
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children  were  born  of  Chinese  mothers  and  Japanese  fathers  and  833  children  of
Chinese fathers and Japanese mothers29. Turning to children’s education, most of the
children of Chinese nationality, unlike European or American children, are taught in
Japanese schools. As compared with the children of Chinese people from Latin America,
the Nikkeijin, it would seem that, on the whole, the Chinese children encounter far
fewer difficulties with their education. The fact that, at secondary level, a large number
of them attend private schools tends to prove their success, given that in Japan private
schools are very selective.
44 When  it  comes  to  political  behaviour,  here  again,  compared  with  other  foreign
communities,  the  Chinese  newcomers  demonstrate  significant  civic  participation.
Chinese  people  are  deeply  involved  in  local  politics,  a  fact  that  overturns  the
stereotypical image of Chinese communities abroad, the idea that they are turned in
upon themselves and remain indifferent to the political life of the host countries. Let us
take, as an example, the case of Kawasaki City Representative Assembly for Foreigner
Residents (Kawasaki-shi gaikokujin daihyô kaigi). We met the Chinese representatives
and former representatives, as well as the Japanese managerial staff and the leaders of
associations affiliated to the Council. It was set up in 1996, being the first such council
in Japan; and it remains today the most active in the country. The selection of Council
members is made on the basis of applicants’ CVs by a selection committee made up of
association  leaders  and  researchers.  Ever  since  it  was  set  up,  the  number  of
applications by Chinese residents has always been particularly high, compared with
those coming from other foreign communities (see Table 6). At the time of the first
session  in  1996,  102  Chinese  people  had  sent  in  their  applications,  from  a  total
population of  3,388  people,  as  against  72  Koreans  (their  community  being twice  as
numerous) and 8 Brazilians from a total population of 1,784 people. With the exception
of the 1998 session, Chinese applications have always been the most numerous, which
seems to reflect a desire to make an investment in local affairs.
45 Integration is a two-way process. Migrants adapt, and become integrated into the host
country.  But  equally,  this  society  must  accept  them,  and  must  itself  change.  Even
though the Chinese seem to suffer less from public ostracism than did the Koreans ten
years ago or than do the Brazilian Nikkeijin today, there is a recent tendency for the
press and public opinion to lay responsibility for the rise in criminality at the Chinese
door. It is questionable whether they have really been accepted.
46 Japanese ethnic and national identity rests today upon a homogeneous concept of the
nation.  This  concept,  very  widely  shared  among  the  people,  presupposes  that  the
Japanese  people  is  united  by  blood  and  by  a  unique  culture:  race  and  culture  are
intimately linked. This concept has until recently led the Japanese to reject, even deny,
the minorities living in Japan (the Burakumin, the Ainu, the Okinawans, the Koreans)
and explains the Japanese people’s  continuing resistance to changing their  ideas of
citizenship or, indeed, even the definition of Japanese identity.
47 The Chinese population in Japan is growing. And, while it is integrating into the host
country, it maintains strong links with the outside world by virtue of its transnational
professional practices and expatriate status. To what extent can its presence challenge
the Japanese concepts of the nation or of citizenship? Other foreign communities have
had  contrasting  experience.  The  Japanese  researchers  Miyajima  Takashi  and  Kajita
Takamichi consider that the presence of a growing number of foreign residents has
already brought the Japanese to reconsider their concept of citizenship30. The Korean
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community, now in its fourth generation and ever more numerous and clearly resettled
in  Japan,  is  making  a  considerable  contribution.  Today,  one  can  be  sociologically
Japanese  without  being  so  ethnically:  that  is  the  case  with  the  oldcomers31.  As  in
Germany, the nature of this citizenship/nationality should continue to evolve, from
being an ethnic concept to being a civic concept. The work of Tsuda Takeyuki on the
Brazilian  Nikkeijin—who  are  ethnically  Japanese  but  culturally  foreigners—is  more
pessimistic  as  to  Japan’s  capacity  to  change.  In  Takeyuki’s  view,  Japanese  people
confronted by the Nikkeijin have become newly aware of their own cultural distinction,
which has led them to reaffirm their ethnic and nationalist identity, thus strengthening
the hegemonic nature of  the Japanese nation-state32.  The presence of  the Nikkeijin,
rather than opening up Japanese concepts of identity, has forced Japanese people back
into their entrenched position, a culturalist definition of their identity that tends to
exclude the Nikkeijin. The new Chinese immigrants in Japan are neither ethnically nor
sociologically Japanese; even though some kind of resocialisation is inevitably taking
place,  their  Chinese  references  are  still  strong.  Because  they  are  numerous,  and
because, though making progress towards integration, they keep their strong Chinese
cultural identity, they will also contribute towards challenging Japanese concepts of
the nation and of citizenship.
48 Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
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RÉSUMÉS
Over the past two decades, Chinese students in large numbers have settled in Japan: a rate of
immigration recalling that of  the early twentieth century.  The inflow has brought about the
creation of a Chinese community whose members are highly qualified and economically well
integrated  into  society.  Japan’s  new  Chinese  residents  are  intellectuals  by  profession.  Their
lifestyle and the way they present themselves set them apart from traditional immigrants. The
concepts of “transnational entrepreneurs” and “expatriates” are called on here to account for
the connections they maintain with China and Japan.
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